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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERA TING 
COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
LAWRENCE, 
Defendant/ Appellants. 
) 
) 
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) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appealed from the District Court of the First Judicial District in the State ofldaho, 
In and For the County of Kootenai 
The Honorable Steve Yerby District Judge Presiding 
Susan P. Weeks 
JAMES VERNON and WEEKS 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene ID 83814 
Telephone: (208) 667-0683 
Facsimile (208) 664-1684 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent 
CAPSTAR Radio Operating Co. 
W. Jeremy Carr, ISB # 6827 
CLARK and FEENEY LLP 
1229 Main Street 
Lewiston ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9516 
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 
Attorney for Defendant/ Appellate 
Douglas and Brenda Lawrence 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING CAPSTAR AN IMPLIED 
EASEMENT 
The district Court, and Capstar, rely on Schultz v. Atkins, 97 Idaho 770, 773-74, 554 P.2d 
948, 951-52 (1976), Bird v. Bidwell, 147 Idaho 350, 209 P.3d 647 (2009), and Davis v. Peacock, 
133 Idaho 637, 641, 991 P.2d 362,366 (1999) to stand for the proposition that Capstar did not need 
to show apparent continuous use. However, all three cases state that apparent continuous use is a 
required element to create an implied easement. 
In Shultz, the Court compared the four elements needed to create an implied easement for 
right of way as set out in 1 Thompson, Real Property Treatise. Those elements were: 
(1) Unity and subsequent separation of title; (2) obvious benefit to the dominant and 
burden to the servient tenement existing at the time of the conveyance; (3) use of the 
premises by the common owner in their altered condition long enough before the 
conveyance to show that the change was intended to be permanent; and ( 4) necessity 
for the easement. 
Shultz, at 774, 554 P.2d at 952. The Court went on to list the essential elements necessary to create 
an implied easement under Idaho's case law. The Court said: 
To establish an easement by implication in favor of the dominant estate, three 
essential elements must be made to appear; (1) Unity of title and subsequent 
separation by grant of dorainant estate; (2) Apparent continuous user; (3) The 
easement must be reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of the dominant 
estate. 
Id. (citing Davis v. Gowen, 83 Idaho 204,210,360 P.2d 403,407 (1961). The Court went on to state 
"that while the phraseology of the requirements set out in Davis v. Gowen, supra, is somewhat 
different from that discussed in 1 Thomson s 396, the same principles are involved." Id. The Shultz 
case clearly identifies apparent continuous use as an essential element necessary to create an implied 
easement. 
The Bird Court held that the three elements necessary to establish an implied easement by 
prior use where: 
( 1) unity of title or ownership and a subsequent separation by grant of the dominant 
estate; (2) apparent continuous use long enough before separation of the dominant 
estate to show that the use was intended to be permanent; and (3) the easement must 
be reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of the dominant estate. 
Bird, at 352,209 P.3d at 649 (2009) (citing Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635,638, 132 P.3d 392, 
395 (2006)). 
In Bird, the plaintiff had established apparent continuous use prior to the separation but did 
not establish that the use was intended to be permanent. Id. At 352,209 P.3d at 649. The Bird Court 
did not do away with the need to show apparent continuous use, but only clarified that a plaintiff 
needed to prove that the apparent continuous use was intended to be permanent. 
The Davis v. Peacock Court also affirmed the need to establish apparent and continuous use 
in order to establish an implied easement by prior use when it stated: "One of the requirements for 
establishing an implied easement by prior use is that there has been open and continuous use of the 
easement prior to the severance of the dominant and servient estates." Davis, at 641,991 P.2d at 366 
(1999) overruled on other grounds by Spokane Structures, Inc. v. Equitable Inv., LLC, 148 Idaho 
616,226 P.3d 1263 (2010). 
All of these cases stated apparent continuous use as one of the required elements necessary 
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to create an implied easement by prior use. The district court did not make a finding that Capstar 
had proven apparent continuous use, nor does the evidence support a finding that Funke had used 
the long enough or sufficiently enough to show it was intended to be permanent. Mr. Funke testified 
that he used the disputed road 20-30 times from 1968 to 1975. (Tr. P. 323, L. 2-5). This is an 
average of three to four times a year. This use over undeveloped lands does not constitute apparent 
and continuous use. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING CAPSTAR A PRESCRIPTIVE 
EASEMENT 
Capstar argues that Mr. Rook's use of the road, nor his agent's use of the road, was 
permissive. This argument ignores the facts of the case. On July 14, 1966, the General Telephone 
Company, ("GTC"), obtained an easement to access an acre ofland in Section 22. (R. P. 139). This 
easement road is crossed what is now the Lawrence's prope1iy. (R. P. 140). Mr. Rook testified that 
after he purchased the property he entered into an access agreement with GTE to use the access road. 
(Tr. P. 513, L. 18-24; P. 514, L. 1-10). Mr. Rook's testimony was that he had GTE's permission 
through their right to use the access road. Using a road across a servient landowner's property with 
the permission of the dominant estate is not hostile or adverse. Neither Rook or Capstar did anything 
to indicate that it was claiming an independent right to use the road other than the right it received 
under GTE. 
The facts of the case are clear that GTE had the legal right to cross the Lawrence property. 
GTE gave Rook the right to use property under their right and gave them a key to access the road that 
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crossed the Lawrence property. (Tr. P. 513, L. 18-24; P. 514, L. 1-10). Capstar must put Lawrence 
on notice that they are claiming some independent right separate than Rook's agreement with 
Capstar. This reasoning is similar to the purpose behind the public use exception. See, Hughes v. 
Fisher, 142 Idaho 474,481, 129 P.3d 1223, 1230 (2006) where the Court held that when a claimant 
is using the land along with members of the general public, it would simply be unfair to impute 
knowledge to the landowner that the claimant is making an adverse claim. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above the Lawrences respectfully request this Court to reverse the 
District Court's Amended Final Judgment holding that respondents have an ingress, egress, and 
utility easement arising from prior use and a prescriptive easement across their real property located 
in Section 21, Township 51 North, Range 5 West, the Courts finding that the scope of said easements 
is for reasonable use without limitation, the Courts issuance of an injunction enjoining the 
Lawrences, agents, and heirs from interfering with, impeding, or preventing Capstar, its agents, 
servants, contractors, employees, tenants, successors, or assigns from using, developing, maintaining, 
improving, and/or servicing said easement. The Lawrences request this Court remand this case back 
to the District Court with instruction to enter a judgement holding that the respondents do not have 
an easement across their property. 
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Respectfully submitted this #day ofJc..nwuy.J.ol (t;, 
CLARK and FEENEY, LLP 
By: Id.,~ 
W. Jeremy C(rr, a member of the firm 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants 
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